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FAMILY LAW- A PROFESSIONAL DEGREE OR LICENSE AC-
QUIRED DURING MARRIAGE IS NOT MARITAL PROPERTY 
SUBJECT TO EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION UNDER THE PROP-
ERTY DISPOSITION IN ANNULMENT AND DIVORCE LAW. 
Archer v. Archer, 303 Md. 347, 493 A.2d 1074 (1985). 
The parties were married while the husband was a medical student. 1 
In order to support the couple and the two children born during the 
marriage, the wife discontinued her education and worked full-time 
while the husband completed his medical education.2 During the mar-
riage the husband acquired a medical degree and license, and completed 
two years of residency. After seven years of marriage, the couple was 
divorced by decree of the Circuit Court of Maryland for Prince George's 
County. 3 The court awarded the wife $100 per month alimony for a 
period not to exceed one year, but denied the wife's prayer for a mone-
tary award based upon the value of the medical degree.4 The court held 
that neither a medical degree nor license is marital property under Mary-
land's Property Disposition in Annulmnent and Divorce Law (Act). 5 
The wife appealed the decision on two alternative theories:6 (1) when 
there is no marital property to distribute, a medical degree and license 
are marital property under the Act; or (2) restitution should be awarded 
for her contributions to her husband's acquisition of a medical degree 
and license. On certiorari,7 the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed 
and noted that restitution was unnecessary because the wife's contribu-
tions to the medical degree were considered by the trial court in making 
its alimony award. 8 
Forty-three jurisdictions provide for equitable distribution of mari-
tal property upon the dissolution of a marriage.9 Under equitable distri-
1. Archer v Archer, 303 Md. 347, 349, 493 A.2d 1074, 1075 (1985). 
2. /d. The husband, however, also received financial support from the Navy. While he 
was a medical student, the Navy paid Thomas Archer's tuition and a monthly sti-
pend of not more than $500. During his summer vacations, he also earned approxi-
mately $1500 each year. !d. 
3. The couple was granted a divorce a vinculo matrimonii on July 12, 1984. /d. at 350, 
493 A.2d at 1076. 
4. /d. The wife also was awarded custody of the couple's two children, and child 
support of $250 per month per child. At the time of the divorce proceedings, the 
wife earned $15,000 per year and the husband earned $19,000 per year. Brief for 
Appellant at 2-3, Archer v. Archer, 303 Md. 347, 493 A.2d 1074 (1985). 
5. Archer, 303 Md. at 350, 493 A.2d at 1076. The Maryland Property Disposition in 
Annulment and Divorce Law is contained in Mo. FAM. LAW CODE ANN.§§ 8-201 
to -213 (1984 & Supp. 1986). The 1986 amendments to the Act do not address 
professional degrees. See infra notes 68-72 and accompanying text. 
6. Appellant's Brief at 4, Archer v. Archer, 303 Md. 347, 493 A.2d 1074 (1985). 
7. The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari to decide this issue of first 
impression prior to consideration of the issue by the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland. Archer v. Archer, 302 Md. 409, 488 A.2d 500 (1985). 
8. Archer, 303 Md. at 359, 493 A.2d at 1081. 
9. 1985 Survey of American Family Law, 11 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 3021 (May 7, 
1985). Forty-two states and the District of Columbia have adopted, either by stat-
ute or judicial fiat, a system of equitable distribution upon divorce of property ac-
quired during marriage. The remaining eight states (Arizona, California, Idaho, 
1987] Archer v. Archer 365 
bution principles, property acquired during marriage, regardless of how 
it is titled, is "marital property." 10 Whether a professional degree ac-
quired by one spouse during marriage is marital property subject to equi-
table distribution has engendered considerable debate 11 and litigation 12 in 
what has been called the "university degree-divorce decree" case. 13 
The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions addressing this issue 
Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington) are community property 
jurisdictions. Id. Community property is premised upon a presumption of equal 
contributions by both spouses to a marriage. Co-ownership of property acquired 
during the marriage vests in each spouse by virtue of the marital relationship. See 
generally Comment, A Property Theory of Future Earning Potential in Dissolution 
Proceedings, 56 WASH. L. REV. 277 (1981). 
10. See, e.g., Mo. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 8-201(e) (1984 & Supp. 1986); PA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 23 § 401(e) (Purdon Supp. 1986); see Falise v. Falise, 63 Md. App. 574, 
580, 493 A.2d 385, 388 (1985) ("Marital property is merely a term created by the 
legislature to describe the status of property acquired during the marriage, however 
titled ... the only function of 'marital property' is to form a base for a 'monetary 
award'."). 
11. The issue has been called "the raging issue in matrimonial law." The Nat'! L.J., 
Nov. 28, 1983, at 1, col. 2. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick & Doucette, Can the Economic 
Value of an Education Really be Measured? A Guide for Marital Property Dissolu-
tion, 21 J. FAM. L. 511 (1982-83); Herring, Divisibility of Advanced Degrees in Equi-
table Distribution States, 19 J. MAR. L. REV. 1 (1985); Krauskopf, Recompense for 
Financing Spouse's Education: Legal Protection for the Marital Investor in Human 
Capital, 28 KAN. L. REV. 379 (1980); Loeb & McCann, Dilemma v. Paradox: Valu-
ation of an Advanced Degree Upon Dissolution of a Marriage, 66 MARQ. L. REv. 495 
(1983); Moore, Should a Professional Degree be Considered a Marital Asset Upon 
Divorce?, 15 AKRON L. REv. 543 (1982); Raggio, Professional Goodwill and Profes-
sional Licenses as Property Subject to Distribution Upon Dissolution of Marriage, 16, 
Number 2, FAM. L.Q. 147 (1982). 
12. See, e.g., In reMarriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978); In re Mar-
riage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978); Inman v. Inman, 648 S.W.2d 
847 (Ky. 1982); DeLaRosa v. DeLaRosa, 309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981); Hubbard 
v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979); Saint-Pierre v. Saint-Pierre, 357 N.W.2d 
250 (S.D. 1984). 
13. Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200, 206, 343 N.W.2d 796, 799-800 (1984). See 
also Mahoney v. Mahoney, 182 N.J. Super. 598, 610, 442 A.2d 1062, 1067 ("career 
threshold, no-asset" divorce), rev'd, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982); Stevens v. 
Stevens, 233 Ohio St. 2d 115, 116,492 N.E.2d 131, 132 (1986) ("diploma di-
lemma"); Raggio, supra note 11, at 147 ("putting hubby through syndrome"). 
The issue in community property states is the same, but the terminology is 
different; the term "marital property" is replaced by "community property." Com-
munity property states also cite equitable distribution cases for support. See Pyeatte 
v. Pyeatte, 135 Ariz. 346, 661 P.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1982) (citing equitable distribu-
tion cases from Colorado, Kentucky, Minnesota, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin). Ac-
cordingly, equitable distribution states cite community property cases for support. 
See Saint-Pierre, 357 N.W.2d 250 (citing community property cases from Arizona 
and Texas). 
In the typical "university degree-divorce decree" case, one spouse agrees to 
forego education and to support the other spouse, who pursues an advanced degree. 
Both parties anticipate that the degree will allow them to share a higher standard of 
living in the future. Upon acquisition of the degree, when the student spouse is 
ready to realize the income from the couple's investment, the couple divorces. Be-
cause the working spouse's income was consumed by the couple's living expenses 
and the student spouse's educational expenses, little or no tangible marital property 
was accumulated during the marriage. The degreed spouse's enhanced earning ca-
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hold that the degree is not marital property. 14 These courts follow the 
leading case, In reMarriage ofGraham, 15 in which the Supreme Court of 
Colorado held that a professional degree is not marital property because 
it does not fall within the traditional definition of property. 16 Unlike 
tangible property, a professional degree has no exchange value and can-
not be assigned, transferred, or purchased,I7 Its value depends, not upon 
mere possession, but upon the future personal efforts, motivation, and 
opportunities presented to the holder. 18 Some courts expand upon this 
reasoning and assert that the degree's value is too speculative to ascer-
tain.19 In addition, distribution of the degree's value requires a valuation 
pacity is often the only valuable asset of the marriage. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d at 206, 
343 N.W.2d at 799-800. 
The "university degree-divorce decree" case is distinguished from one where, 
although the professional degree is attained under similar circumstances, the mar-
riage is of longer duration and the couple accumulates tangible marital assets that 
can be equitably distributed by the court. See Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 341, 
631 P.2d 115, 123 (1981). 
14. In reMarriage of Weinstein, 128 Ill. App. 3d 234, 239,470 N.E.2d 551, 555 (1984). 
E.g., Hughes v. Hughes, 438 So. 2d 146 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Ruben v. Ruben, 
123 N.H. 358, 361, 461 A.2d 733, 735 (1983); Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 496, 453 A.2d at 
531; Stevens, 23 Ohio St. 3d at 117, 492 N.E.2d at 133; Hubbard, 603 P.2d at 750; 
Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814 (Wyo. 1984). 
15. 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978). 
16. In reMarriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429,432, 574 P.2d 75,77 (1978). (The court 
split 4-3 and a strong dissent was filed.). 
17. /d. 
18. /d. The Graham court's often quoted language is: 
An educational degree, such as an MBA, is simply not encompassed even 
by the broad views of the concept of 'property.' It does not have an ex-
change value or any objective transferable value on an open market. It is 
personal to the holder. It terminates on death of the holder and is not 
inheritable. It cannot be assigned, sold, transferred, conveyed, or pledged. 
An advanced degree is a cumulative product of many years of previous 
education, combined with diligence and hard work. It may not be ac-
quired by the mere expenditure of money. It is simply an intellectual 
achievement that may potentially assist in the future acquisition of prop-
erty. In our view, it has none of the attributes of property in the usual 
sense of that term. 
/d. The court also stated that the contribution by one spouse toward the profes-
sional degree of the other spouse is but one of several factors to be considered by the 
court in two situations: (1) if marital property is distributed, and (2) if maintenance 
is awarded. /d. at 433, 574 P.2d at 78. As the dissent pointed out, however, neither 
situation applied to the Grahams. Other than Mr. Graham's MBA degree, the 
couple had accumulated no assets during their marriage because their funds had 
been expended on their living expenses and on Mr. Graham's education. /d. (Carri-
gan, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the Colorado statute restricts maintenance to 
cases where the party is incapable of self-support: by supporting the couple during 
their marriage, Mrs. Graham demonstrated an ability to support herself; therefore, 
she was not entitled to alimony. /d. at 435, 574 P.2d at 78-79 (Carrigan, J., 
dissenting). 
19. Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 496, 453 A.2d 527, 532 (1982) ("Valuing a 
professional degree in the hands of any particular individual at the start of his or her 
career would involve a gamut of calculation that reduces to little more than guess-
work."). But see Thomas v. Thomas, 131 Mich. App. 830, 346 N.W.2d 595 (1985) 
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and distribution of projected future earnings. 20 This violates equitable 
distribution principles that require distribution of property acquired dur-
ing the marriage.21 Courts have also expressed concern that recognizing 
a professional degree as marital property will open a floodgate of litiga-
tion22 or will violate the thirteenth amendment of the United States 
Constitution. 23 
Recently, the Graham court's reasoning was rejected by the New 
York Court of Appeals in O'Brien v. O'Brien.24 The O'Brien court was 
influenced by the legislative history and specific provisions of its equita-
ble distribution statute.25 In particular, the court found persuasive the 
(Reversing trial court that had stated, "I'll tell you what the value of a law school 
education is. It is zero."). 
20. See In reMarriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 461, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668, 678 
(1979) ("The value of a legal education lies in the potential for increase in the future 
earning capacity of the acquiring spouse. . . . A determination that such an asset is 
community property would require a division of post-dissolution earnings to the 
extent that they are attributable to the law degree."). 
21. Id. 
22. See O'Brien v. O'Brien, 106 A.D.2d 223, 227, 485 N.Y.S.2d 548, 551 ("What kind 
of property are we all talking about? If it be property at common law it conjures up 
all kinds of problems, constitutional and otherwise. Not alone a spouse, but every 
judgment creditor of a debtor would be in a position to attach and execute against 
such property. Such a proposition is filled with indescribable mischief and cannot 
seriously be entertained."), modified, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 
743 (1985); Lesman v. Lesman, 110 Misc. 2d 815, 817,442 N.Y.S.2d 955,957 (Sup. 
Ct. 1981) ("If a medical license in and of itself has intrinsic value, then it would 
follow that a license to practice law, to teach, to be a plumber, an engineer, a certi-
fied public accountant, and so on, on the theory of equal enforcement of the law, 
would all be subject to Equitable Distribution."), modified, 88 A.D.2d 153, 452 
N.Y.S.2d 935 (1982); see also Comment, For Richer or Poorer- Equities in theCa-
reer-Threshold, No-Asset Divorce, 58 TUL. L. REV. 791, 795 (1984). 
23. See Severs v. Severs, 426 So. 2d 992, 994 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) ("Such an award 
... would trasmute the bonds of marriage into the bonds of involuntary servitude 
contrary to Amendment XIII of the United States Constitution."). 
24. 66 N.Y.2d 576, 583, 489 N.E.2d 712, 715, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 746 (1985). The court 
stated: 
[Marital property] is a statutory creature, is of no meaning whatsoever 
during the normal course of a marriage and arises full-grown, like Athena, 
upon the signing of a separation agreement or the commencement of a 
matrimonial action. Thus it is hardly surprising, and not at all relevant, 
that traditional common law property concepts do not fit in parsing the 
meaning of 'marital property.' 
/d. (quoting Florescue, "Market Value," Professional Licenses and Marital Property: 
A Dilemma in Search of a Horn, N.Y. ST. BAR Ass'N FAM. L. REv. 13 (Dec. 
1982)). The court also stated, "whether a professional license constitutes marital 
property is to be judged by the language of the statute which created this new spe-
cies of property previously unknown at common law .... Thus, whether the license 
fits within traditional property concepts is of no consequence." /d. at 586, 489 
N.E.2d at 717, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 748. The court noted, however, that a professional 
license may be cognizable as a valuable property right outside the context of its 
statutory meaning; its value is reflected in the "money, effort and lost opportunity 
for employment expended in its acquisition." /d. 
25. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 584-85,489 N.E.2d 712, 716, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 
747 (1985) (citing N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW§ 236[B] (McKinney 1986)). 
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statute's mandate that spousal contributions to the career or career po-
tential of the other spouse be considered26 when the court makes a prop-
erty distribution. When the interest can not be distributed, the statute 
provides for a monetary award. 27 The court concluded that the legisla-
ture believed one spouse's contributions to the other's career "repre-
sent[s] investments in the economic partnership of the marriage and that 
the product of the parties' joint efforts, the professional license, should be 
considered marital property."28 Except for New York's highest court, 
only lower state courts have held that a professional degree is marital 
property. 29 
Nevertheless, a growing number of courts30 recognize the unfairness 
26. !d. at 584, 489 N.E.2d at 715-16, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 746-47. The statute reads in part: 
In determining an equitable disposition of property under paragraph c, the 
court shall consider: . . . 
(6) any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribu-
tion made to the acquisition of such marital property by the party not 
having title, including joint efforts or expenditures and contributions and 
services as a spouse, parent, wage earner and homemaker, and to theca-
reer or career potential of the other party .... 
N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW§ 236[B][5][d][6] (McKinney 1986). 
27. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 584, 489 N.E.2d at 716, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 747. The statute 
provides in part: 
In any action in which the court shall determine that an equitable distribu-
tion is appropriate but would be impractical or burdensome or where the 
distribution of an interest in a business, corporation or profession would be 
contrary to law, the court in lieu of such equitable distribution shall make 
a distributive award in order to achieve equity between the parties. 
N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW§ 236 [B][5][e] (McKinneyl986). 
28. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 584, 489 N.E.2d at 716, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 747. Members of the 
legal community support the view that marriage is an economic partnership in 
which the working spouse invests and, therefore, should share in the "human capi-
tal" of the student spouse. See Hodge v. Hodge, 337 Pa. Super. 151, 167, 486 A.2d 
951, 960 (1984) (Wickersham, J., concurring and dissenting); Krauskopf, supra note 
11, at 379; Weitzman, The Economic Consequences of Divorce: An Empirical Study 
of Property, Alimony and Child Support Awards, 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 4037 
(1982). 
29. See, e.g., Reen v. Reen, 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2193 (Mass. Prob. and Fam. Ct. 
1981) (holding the husband's license to practice orthodontia a marital asset and 
subject to distribution); Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. 258, 337 
N.W.2d 332 (1983) (holding a law degree marital property). The Woodworth court 
stressed the need to reach an equitable solution in light of the substantial contribu-
tion and sacrifice of the supporting spouse and remanded for a determination of the 
present value of the husband's future earnings attributable to the law degree earned 
during the marriage. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. at 263, 269, 337 N.W.2d at 335, 
337; see also Thomas v. Thomas, 131 Mich. App. 830, 346 N.W.2d 595 (1984) (fol-
lowing Woodworth). The precedentia1 value of Woodworth, however, is uncertain. 
See Olah v. Olah, 135 Mich. App. 404, 354 N.W.2d 359 (1984) ("we do not adhere 
to the proposition that a degree is property and therefore a marital asset"). In Carl-
son v. Carlson, 139 Mich. App. 299, 362 N.W.2d 258 (1984), the Court of Appeals 
of Michigan acknowledged but did not resolve this conflict. 
30. E.g., Inman v. Inman, 648 S.W.2d 847 (Ky. 1982); DeLaRosa v. DeLaRosa, 309 
N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488,453 A.2d 527 (1982); 
Lehmicke v. Lehmicke, 339 Pa. Super. 559, 489 A.2d 782 (1985); Washburn v. 
Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d 168, 677 P.2d 152 (1984); Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 
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that results when the degreed spouse is permitted to leave the marriage 
with what is arguably its only asset. 31 These courts agree with the Gra-
ham dissent that "equity demands that the courts seek extraordinary 
remedies to prevent [the] extraordinary injustice"32 that will result unless 
the supporting spouse is compensated. 33 Restitution in quantum meruit 
is an appropriate remedy because the supporting spouse's personal sacri-
fices and financial contributions were made with a "reasonable expecta-
tion"34 that the degree would result in a higher standard of living for 
both spouses. 35 Thus, unjust enrichment to the student spouse is 
avoided.36 
When courts grant restitution, the nature of the award varies. "Re-
imbursement alimony," originated by the Supreme Court of New 
200, 343 N.W.2d 796 (1984). See generally Brigner, I Put Him Through School ... 
Now He Says We're Finished!, 4 ABA Fam. Advoc., Winter, 1982, at 16. 
31. See Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 135 Ariz. 346, 357,661 P.2d 196, 207 (1982) ("Appellant has 
left the marriage with the only valuable asset acquired during the marriage - his 
legal education and qualification to practice law."); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 
747, 751 (Okla. 1979) ("There is no reason in law or equity why Dr. Hubbard 
should retain the only valuable asset which was accumulated through joint efforts, 
i.e., his increased earning capacity, free of claims for reimbursement by his wife."); 
Lundberg v. Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1, 14, 318 N.W.2d 918,924 (1984) ("In a sense 
[the husband's] medical degree is the most significant asset of the marriage. It is 
only fair that [the wife] be compensated for her costs and foregone opportunities 
resulting from her support while [her husband] was in school."). 
32. Graham, 194 Colo. at 434, 574 P.2d at 78 (Carrigan, J., dissenting). 
33. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma stated: 
We have no quarrel with the Graham majority's resolution of the "prop-
erty" question .... This determination does not mean, however, that Ms. 
Hubbard is thereby precluded from receiving an award in lieu of property 
division, for this case presents broad questions of equity and natural jus-
tice which cannot be avoided on such narrow grounds .... We are not 
rendered impotent to do equity between these parties ... . 
Hubbard, 603 P.2d at 750-51. See also Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 500,453 A.2d at 533-34 
("[E]very joint undertaking has its bounds of fairness. . . . It is ... patently unfair 
that the supporting spouse be denied the mutually anticipated benefit while the sup-
ported spouse keeps not only the degree, but also all of the financial and material 
rewards flowing from it."); DeLaRosa v. DeLaRosa, 309 N.W.2d 755, 758 (Minn. 
1981) ("The equities weigh heavily in favor of providing a remedy to the working 
spouse in such a situation .... "). 
34. DeLaRosa, 309 N.W. 2d at 758. 
35. The Supreme Court of Arizona stated: 
A benefit may be any type of advantage, including that which saves the 
recipient from any loss or expense. Appellee's support of appellant during 
his period of schooling clearly constituted a benefit to appellant. Absent 
appellee's support, appellant may not have attended law school, may have 
been forced to prolong his education ... or may have gone deeply into 
debt .... Historically, restitution for the value of services rendered has 
been available ... upon quasi-contractual grounds. . . . [A] quasi-contract 
is not a contract at all, but a duty imposed in equity upon a party to repay 
another to prevent his own enrichment. 
Pyeatte, 135 Ariz. at 352-53, 661 P.2d at 202-03 (citations omitted). See also DeLa 
Rosa, 309 N.W.2d at 758; Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 500, 453 A.2d at 533-34; Hubbard, 
603 P.2d at 751; Haugan v. Haugan, 343 N.W.2d 796, 800 (Wis. 1984). 
36. Haugan, 343 N.W.2d at 800. 
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Jersey,37 provides "a fair and effective means of compensating a support-
ing spouse who has suffered a loss or reduction of support, or has in-
curred a lower standard of living, or has been deprived of a better 
standard of living in the future." 38 The court, however, cautioned that 
reimbursement alimony is not a proper remedy in all cases.39 For exam-
ple, reimbursement alimony is unnecessary if sufficient property is avail-
able for distribution, or if rehabilitative alimony is appropriate.40 
Furthermore, alimony as the basis of an award is often inappropri-
ate.41 Restrictions imposed on the alimony recipient may be deemed un-
acceptable.42 Moreover, some states prohibit an alimony award to a 
spouse who is capable of self-support.43 For these and other reasons,44 
courts often choose to grant a supporting spouse a monetary award based 
on equitable principles "in the nature of recompense."45 
Courts also vary in the valuation method used when awarding resti-
tution. Recoveries range from those limited to direct educational costs46 
to broader recoveries encompassing educational and living expenses,47 
and any other related contribution.48 Some courts also include the de-
gree holder's potential for increased earnings in their calculations.49 The 
Supreme Court of New Jersey limited reimbursement alimony to those 
financial contributions made "with the mutual and shared expectation" 
that both spouses ultimately would reap the benefits of the professional 
37. Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982). 
38. Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 501, 453 A.2d at 534. The court explained, "Marriage should 
not be a free ticket to professional education and training without subsequent obli-
gations. . . . One spouse ought not to receive a divorce complaint when the other 
receives a diploma." /d. at 503, 453 A.2d at 535. 
39. /d. 
40. /d. 
41. Grosskopfv. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814, 821 (Wyo. 1984) ("there has been a tendency 
away from alimony"). 
42. See Hubbard, 603 P.2d at 752 (recovery founded on alimony would force recipient 
"to forego remarriage and perhaps even be celibate for many years"). 
43. See, e.g., DeLaRosa, 309 N.W.2d at 757 (citing MINN. STAT. § 518.552 (1980)); 
Lehmicke v. Lehmicke, 339 Pa. Super. 559, 567, 489 A.2d 782, 786 (1985) (citing 
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 40l(d)(4) (Purdon Supp. 1986)). See also In reMarriage 
of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 435, 574 P.2d 75, 78-79 (1978) ("[T]he Colorado statute 
would seem to preclude an award of maintenance here, for it restricts the court's 
power to award maintenance to cases where the spouse seeking it is unable to sup-
port himself or herself.") (citing CoLO. REV. STAT.§ 14-10-114 (1973)). For a dis-
cussion of Maryland's alimony law, see infra notes 90, 93-99, and accompanying 
text. 
44. See Pyeatte, 135 Ariz. 346, 661 P.2d 196 (alimony not an issue before the court); 
Hubbard, 603 P.2d at 751-52 ("Equity would not be served by holding ... that Ms. 
Hubbard's recovery be limited to alimony for support and maintenance."). 
45. Lehmicke, 339 Pa. Super. at 568, 489 A.2d at 787. See also DeLaRosa, 309 N.W.2d 
755; Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747. 
46. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747. 
47. Pyeatte, 135 Ariz. 346, 661 P.2d 196. 
48. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527; Lehmicke, 339 Pa. Super. 559, 489 A.2d 782. 
49. In reMarriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978); Inman v. Inman, 648 
S.W.2d 847 (Ky. 1982); Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200, 343 N.W.2d 796 
(1984). 
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training. 50 The Supreme Court of Wyoming stated that an appropriate 
award may be one that affords the working spouse "an opportunity to 
obtain the same degree under the same circumstances."51 
Despite the considerable litigation, Indiana is the only equitable dis-
tribution state52 whose legislature specifically has addressed the issue. In 
1979, the following subsection was added to the Indiana Code: 
When the court finds there is little or no marital property, it 
may award either spouse a money judgment not limited to the 
property existing at the time of final separation. However, this 
award may be made only for the financial contribution of one 
[1] spouse toward tuition, books, and laboratory fees for the 
higher education of the other spouse. 53 
Thus, Indiana provides an award of last resort that is limited to reim-
bursement, but does not allow a return on the working spouse's 
investment. 
In Maryland, a specially appointed Commission54 drafted the Prop-
50. Mahoney, 9! N.J. at 503, 453 A.2d at 535. 
51. Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814, 823 (Wyo. 1984). 
52. California, a community property state, also has enacted legislation that provides 
for reimbursement of educational expenses that have benefited primarily one of the 
spouses. The statute reads in part: 
(b) Subject to the limitations provided in this section, upon dissolution of 
marriage or legal separation: 
(I) The community shall be reimbursed for community contribu-
tions to education or training of a party that substantially enhances the 
earning capacity of the party. The amount reimbursed shall be with inter-
est at the legal rate, accruing from the end of the calendar year in which 
the contributions were made. 
(2) A loan incurred during marriage for the education or training 
of a party shall not be included among the liabilities of the community for 
the purpose of division pursuant to Section 4800 but shall be assigned for 
payment by the party. 
CAL CIV. CODE§ 4800.3 (West 1984). See also Law Revision Commission Com-
ment, CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.3 (West 1984) ("Although the education, degree, or 
license or the resulting enhanced earning capacity is not 'property' subject to divi-
sion, community expenditures for them are properly subject to reimbursement."). 
53. IND. CODE ANN.§ 31-1-11.5-ll(d) (Burns 1980 & Supp. 1986). By contrast, Penn-
sylvania courts have broad discretion in fashioning an appropriate remedy. The 
statute provides in part: 
In all matrimonial causes, the court shall have full equity power and juris-
diction and may issue injunctions or other orders which are necessary to 
protect the interests of the parties or to effectuate the purposes of this act, 
and may grant such other relief or remedy as equity and justice require 
against either party or against any third person over whom the court has 
jurisdiction and who is involved in or concerned with the disposition of the 
cause. 
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 40l(c) (Purdon Supp. 1986). In Lehmicke v. Lehmicke, 
339 Pa. Super. 559, 567, 489 A.2d 782, 786-87 (1985), the court construed this 
statute as authorizing a compensatory award to the working spouse for the financial 
support given the student spouse. 
54. See REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAWS 
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erty Disposition in Annulment and Divorce Law55 (Act) to remedy the 
inequities inherent in the then existing title system of property distribu-
tion upon the dissolution of a marriage. 5 6 Under this system, the spouse 
vested with title retained the property.57 A spouse who purchased prop-
erty with joint funds, but titled it individually, was permitted to retain 
the property upon dissolution of the marriage without compensating the 
other spouse. 58 The title system did not recognize a homemaker's non-
monetary contributions to marriage. 59 The Commission believed its pro-
posed Bill would provide fairer treatment to both spouses because 
equitable distribution principles recognize both the monetary and non-
monetary contributions of spouses toward the acquisition of marital 
property. 60 
The Act does not mention professional degrees or career assets, nor 
does it expressly provide compensation to a supporting spouse for contri-
1 (Jan. 1978) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT]. The Commission's proposed Bill 
was enacted with only slight modification. 
55. 1978 Md. Laws 2304 (codified at Mo. CTs. & Juo. PROC. CODE ANN.§§ 3-6A-01 
to -08, recodified at Mo. FAM. LAW CODE ANN.§§ 8-201 to -213 effective October 
1, 1984, amended 1986). See generally Legislation, Property Disposition Upon Di-
vorce in Maryland: An Analysis of the New Statute, 8 U. BALT. L. REV. 377 (1979). 
56. "The Commission, after painstaking and extensive deliberation, concluded that 
what was needed in fact was a definition of the rights of the parties, in the disposi-
tion of property upon divorce or annulment, which would correct those inequities 
that uncorrected historical development of the law has wrought .... " COMMISSION 
REPORT, supra note 53, at 14. The purpose of the Marital Property Act is to "end 
the inequity in Maryland's old 'title' system of dealing with the marital property of 
divorcing spouses." Harper v. Harper, 294 Md. 54, 63, 448 A.2d 916, 920 (1982) 
(quoting COMMISSION REPORT at 1). 
57. See Legislation, supra note 54, at 380 n.26. If property was titled individually in the 
name of one spouse, the court could neither transfer title nor grant a monetary 
award to the non-titled spouse. /d. at 380-81 nn. 26-32. Thus, under prior Mary-
land law the issue in Archer could not have been maintained because the degree was 
in the graduate's name. 
58. See Woodall v. Woodall, 16 Md. App. 17, 293 A.2d 839 (1972). Although the 
working wife contributed all her income to either her husband or the household, she 
was denied a share of the value of stock purchased with money from a joint bank 
account because the stock was purchased by the husband and titled in only his 
name. /d. 
59. See Gebhard v. Gebhard, 253 Md. 125, 130, 252 A.2d 171, 174 (1969). The wife 
was awarded one-third of stock titled in her husband's name in recognition of her 
services as homemaker and unsalaried secretary in her husband's business. The 
court of appeals reversed the award stating, "No authority exists for a division [of 
assets] between parties ... because of the work efforts of the parties." /d. 
60. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 53, at 5. 
The Commission does not believe that the people of Maryland today hold 
the view that a spouse whose activities within the marriage do not include 
the production of income has 'never contributed anything toward the 
purchase' of property acquired during the marriage. Its members believe 
that non-monetary contributions within a marriage are real and should be 
recognized in the event that the marriage is dissolved or annulled. 
/d. at 3 (referring specifically to Gebhard, 253 Md. 125, 252 A.2d 171). See also 
Harper v. Harper, 294 Md. 54, 63, 448 A.2d 916, 919-20 (1982); Bender v. Bender, 
282 Md. 525, 534 n.7, 386 A.2d 772, 778 n.7 (1978). 
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butions to the student spouse's degree. 61 Under the Act, the court must 
determine whether property is marital property, but it is given no guide-
lines in making this classification. 62 Marital property is defined as "prop-
erty, however titled, acquired by [one] or both parties during the 
marriage."63 After the property is classified as marital property, it must 
be valued. 64 The court may not change the title to property; in lieu of 
actual distribution of property, the court may grant a monetary award to 
either spouse "as an adjustment of the equities and rights of the parties 
concerning marital property."65 Nine specific factors must be considered 
by the court in determining the amount and method of payment of the 
award. 66 In addition, the court may consider any other factor it deems 
necessary in order to achieve a fair and equitable award. 67 
The Act was construed by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in 
Deering v. Deering,68 to include as marital property pension benefits that 
accrued during marriage. 69 The court noted the "sweeping" language of 
the Act and the broad and comprehensive meaning of the term "prop-
erty" defined as "everything which has an exchangeable value or goes to 
make up a man's wealth."70 The court held that a vested pension is a 
form of deferred compensation and not a mere expectancy.71 The em-
61. Several bills have been proposed to the Maryland General Assembly that would 
have required the court, when granting a monetary award under section 8-205, to 
consider the contributions by one spouse toward the education or career potential of 
the other spouse. See S. 2, 39lst Leg., 1987 Md. S. Bills; S. 14, 390th Leg., 1986 
Md. S. Bills; H. 131, 390th Leg., 1986 H. Bills. These bills were all defeated and, in 
fact, were unnecessary. See Mo. FAM. LAW CODE ANN.§ 8-205(a)(l0) (the court 
may consider any factor it deems necessary or appropriate to achieve a fair and 
equitable award). 
62. See MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 8-203 (1984 & Supp. 1986). 
63. /d. § 8-20l(e). The statute further provides: 
/d. 
(2) "Marital property" does not include property: 
(i) acquired before the marriage; 
(ii) acquired by inheritance or gift from a third party; 
(iii) excluded by valid agreement; or 
(iv) directly traceable to any of these sources. 
64. /d. § 8-204. 
65. /d. § 8-205(a). 
66. Id. § 8-205(a)(l)-(9); see infra note 90. 
67. /d. § 8-205(a)(l0). 
68. 292 Md. 115, 437 A.2d 883 (1981). 
69. Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 115, 128,437 A.2d 883, 890 (1981). Section 8-205 was 
amended in 1986 to allow the trial court to transfer "an interest in a pension, retire-
ment, profit sharing, or deferred compensation plan" between spouses. Mo. FAM. 
LAW CODE ANN. § 8-205 (Supp. 1986). 
70. /d. at 125, 437 A.2d at 889. 
71. /d. at 121-28, 437 A.2d at 890. The court adopted the reasoning of the Supreme 
Court of California which held as marital property a non-vested pension. In re 
Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 544 P.2d 561 (1976). The 
Brown court explained that a contingent future interest is recognized at law as prop-
erty, and the contingency is a valuation issue. Deering, 292 Md. at 128, 437 A.2d at 
890 (citing Brown, 15 Cal. 3d at 847-88, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 638-39, 544 P.2d at 566-
67). 
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ployee has a present property right in the pension; therefore, to the extent 
accumulated during marriage, it is marital property.72 Although the 
pension is titled in only the employee's name, the spouse has an interest 
in the amount that accrued during the marriage. 73 
In Archer v. Archer, 74 the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a 
medical degree or license is not marital property under the Act. 75 Resti-
tution was unnecessary because compensation to the supporting spouse 
presumably was achieved under the alimony statute.76 The court re-
viewed the Act's legislative history and found nothing that indicated an 
intent to include a professional degree within the meaning of marital 
property.77 Although the word property had been construed liberally in 
Deering and other cases, 78 a professional degree or license does not pos-
sess any of the basic characteristics of property.79 A degree is merely an 
intellectual achievement, 80 and represents a future expectancy of en-
hanced earnings81 that is "too uncertain and speculative"82 to be marital 
property. Therefore, a degree or license is not subject to equitable distri-
bution through a monetary award under section 8-205 of the Act. 83 
The Archer court has construed the Act correctly: its holding is 
dictated by the use of the word "property" to define the statutory term 
"marital property."84 Because the word "property" is not defined in the 
Act, the court analogized to prior case law and properly distinguished 
72. Deering, 292 Md. at 127-28, 437 A.2d at 890 (citing Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 126 Cal. 
Rptr. 633, 544 P.2d 561). 
73. Deering, 292 Md. at 128, 437 A.2d at 890. 
74. 303 Md. 347, 493 A.2d 1074 (1985). 
75. Archer v. Archer, 303 Md. 347, 357, 493 A.2d 1074, 1079 (1985). Like almost all 
other jurisdictions addressing the issue, the Archer court did not distinguish between 
a professional degree and the license to practice. But see Moss v. Moss, 639 S.W.2d 
370, 374 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982) (a pharmaceutical degree may be marital property, 
but a license to practice may not). 
76. Archer, 303 Md. at 359, 493 A.2d at 1081. 
77. /d. at 357, 493 A.2d at 1079. 
78. /d. at 356, 493 A.2d at 1079 (citing, inter alia, Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 115, 437 
A.2d 883 (1981)). See supra text accompanying notes 67-71. 
79. /d. at 357, 493 A.2d at 1079 (citing In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 433, 
574 P.2d 75, 77 (1978)). 
80. Archer, 303 Md. at 357, 493 A.2d at 1079. 
81. !d. (emphasis added). Income earned after the marriage's dissolution is not marital 
property because by definition marital property is property acquired during the 
marriage. !d. at 358, 493 A.2d at 1080. Accord Queen v. Queen, 308 Md. 574, 521 
A.2d 320 (1987) (only that part of a spouse's lump sum permanent partial disability 
award that compensates for loss of earning capacity during the marriage is marital 
property); Green v. Green, 64 Md. App. 122, 494 A.2d 721 (1985) (stock options 
acquired during marriage are marital property). 
82. Archer, 303 Md. 357, 493 A.2d at 1080. 
83. !d. The Archer court also acknowledged additional reasons for not holding a profes-
sional degree marital property: the degree's value is too speculative, and characteriz-
ing spousal contributions as an investment deserving recompense demeans marriage. 
!d. at 352-53, 493 A.2d at 1077. 
84. See Mo. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 8-201(e)(l) (defining marital property as "the 
property, however titled, acquired by [one] or both parties during the marriage"). 
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Deering. 85 Unlike a pension, a professional degree has no exchange value 
and may not be assigned to a spouse or any other person. 86 Although 
both may be earned during marriage, a pension creates a present prop-
erty right whereas a degree represents only an expectancy.87 When the 
parties' divorce follows closely upon attainment of the degree and before 
the new career is embarked upon, this expectancy will not be realized 
until after the marriage's dissolution. 88 Thus, because no right to income 
accrues during marriage, the degree is not marital property. 89 
Although the narrow holding of Archer is correct, the result is un-
fair and the Act's equitable purpose is not achieved. The Commission 
and the Legislature focused on the unfairness that resulted upon the dis-
solution of a marriage when nonmonetary contributions to the accumula-
tion of property were not recognized. 90 The Act, therefore, adequately 
provides for property distribution upon the divorce of a "traditional" 
couple where one spouse supported the family financially while the other 
spouse contributed as homemaker.91 As Archer demonstrates, however, 
85. Archer, 303 Md. at 357, 493 A.2d at 1080-81; cf Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 115, 
437 A.2d 883 (1981). 
86. Archer, 303 Md. at 357, 493 A.2d at 1080-81. 
87. /d. A professional degree "does not have an assignable value nor does it represent a 
guarantee of receipt of a set monetary amount in the future, such as pension bene-
fits." /d. at 357, 493 A.2d at 1080. 
88. Id. at 358, 493 A.2d at 1080. 
89. /d. 
90. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 53, at 3, 6; see also Bledsoe v. Bledsoe, 294 Md. 
183, 189, 448 A.2d 353, 356 (1982). 
91. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 53, at 3. If the "traditional" couple accumu-
lated marital property during their marriage, the court may grant the homemaker 
spouse a monetary award "as an adjustment of the equities and rights of the parties 
concerning marital property, whether or not alimony is awarded." Mo. FAM. LAW 
CODE ANN. § 8-205(a). Among the factors the court must consider in granting a 
monetary award are: 
/d. 
(1) the contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to 
the well-being of the family; ... 
(3) the economic circumstances of each party at the time the award is 
made; ... 
(8) how and when specific marital property ... was acquired, includ-
ing the effort expended by each party in accumulating the marital property 
... ; [and] 
(9) any award of alimony ... that the court has made .... 
Whether or not a monetary award is granted, the homemaker spouse may be 
awarded alimony. A monetary award is a factor to be considered by the court when 
awarding alimony. /d. § 11-106(b)(ll)(ii). Other factors the court must consider 
in granting alimony are: 
(1) the ability of the party seeking alimony to be wholly or partly 
self-supporting; 
(2) the time necessary for the party seeking alimony to gain suffi-
cient education or training to enable that party to find suitable 
employment; 
(3) the standard of living that the parties established during their 
marriage; 
(4) the duration of the marriage; 
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the "university degree-divorce decree" case is not reached by the Act.92 
In this case, the working-homemaker spouse is in effect penalized for 
providing, in addition to homemaking services, the financial support that 
enabled the other spouse to attend school. The student spouse acquires a 
degree "with the fruits of the wage earner spouse's labors"93 that other-
wise would have been saved or used to purchase tangible property. Had 
the couple accumulated savings or other assets instead of a degree, those 
assets would be marital property and the working-homemaker spouse 
could receive a monetary award under the Act.94 
The Archer court incorrectly concluded that an adequate remedy is 
available to a supporting spouse under the alimony statute.95 The com-
mon law concept of alimony as a lifetime pension has been superseded by 
rehabilitative alimony that is awarded for the purpose of providing the 
dependent spouse an opportunity to become self-supporting.96 Although 
the sacrifices and contributions made toward the other spouse's degree 
may be considered by the trial court in awarding alimony,97 the court 
also must consider "the ability of the party seeking alimony to be wholly 
or partly self-supporting"98 and the amount of time needed for that party 
"to gain sufficient education or training to enable that party to find suita-
ble employment. " 99 Permanent alimony may be awarded in only limited 
circumstances, for example, when a dependent spouse is incapable of 
(5) the contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to 
the well-being of the family .... 
/d. § ll-106(b). In addition, the court may award alimony for an indefinite period 
if: 
(1) due to age, illness, infirmity, or disability, the party seeking ali-
mony cannot reasonably be expected to make substantial progress toward 
becoming self-supporting; or 
(2) even after the party seeking alimony will have made as much 
progress toward becoming self-supporting as can reasonably be expected, 
the respective standards of living of the parties will be unconscionably 
disparate. 
/d. § 11-106(c). 
As a result of the monetary award and alimony statutes, the court can ensure 
that neither spouse in the "traditional" marriage is better off after the divorce be-
cause of sacrificies and benefits conferred during the marriage. See In re Marriage 
of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885, 888 (Iowa 1978). 
92. Section 8-205 is inapplicable and cannot be used to compensate a spouse's contribu-
tions to marriage when no marital property exists upon which to base the award. 
See Ward v. Ward, 52 Md. App. 336, 449 A.2d 443 (1982) (a monetary award under 
section 8-205 may not exceed the value of the marital property). Thus, only an 
award payable out of future earnings will allow an equitable resolution to the "uni-
versity degree-divorce decree" problem. 
93. Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 115, 124, 437 A.2d 883, 888 (1981). 
94. See Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 500-01, 453 A.2d 527, 534 (1982). 
95. Archer v. Archer, 303 Md. 347, 359, 493 A.2d 1074, 1081 (1985). 
96. Campolattaro v. Campolattaro, 66 Md. App. 68, 502 A.2d 1068 (1986); Holston v. 
Holston, 58 Md. App. 308, 473 A.2d 459 (1984). 
97. Archer, 303 Md. at 359, 493 A.2d at 1081. 
98. Mo. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § ll-106(b)(l). 
99. /d. § ll-106(b)(2). 
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achieving financial independence. 100 When the spouse seeking compen-
sation was employed during the marriage and supported the family while 
the other spouse pursued an advanced education, the working spouse has 
demonstrated a capability of self-support and arguably is not entitled to 
alimony under the statute. 101 Mrs. Archer, who worked throughout the 
marriage to support the couple and their children, received only $100 per 
month alimony for a period not to exceed one year. 102 The appellate 
record does not disclose whether the trial judge, in awarding this 
amount, felt constrained by the statutory limitations. 
Despite the inadequacy of a statutory remedy based upon either ali-
mony or a monetary award, the Archer court apparently was unwilling to 
grant equitable relief. By choosing alimony as the appropriate remedy 
and by ignoring restitution as an alternative, the court implicitly rejected 
the alternative plea in equity for compensation. 103 Whether the court 
was influenced by the appellant's failure to fully develop this avenue of 
reliefl04 or by the less than compelling facts of the case is unclear. 105 
Because the court did not distinguish Archer from analogous cases in 
other jurisdictions where restitution was awarded, 106 however, it is un-
likely the court would have awarded restitution under more egregious 
circumstances. Furthermore, the court's statement, "if public policy dic-
tates that some economic compensation be made" to a supporting 
spouse, 107 demonstrates the court's uncertainty concerning whether resti-
100. /d. § 11-106(c)(l). 
101. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
102. See supra text accompanying note 4. 
103. Appellant's Brief at 4, Archer v. Archer, 303 Md. 347, 493 A.2d 1074 (1985). The 
wife plead, "In the alternative, Appellant submits that she is entitled to compensa-
tion for the financial contributions and other support she provided Appellee while 
he earned his medical degree and worked toward satisfying his residency require-
ment." /d. The court indirectly addressed this alternative plea for compensation 
stating, "if public policy dictates that some economic compensation be made to a 
spouse who makes monetary and nonmonetary contributions to the other spouse's 
acquisition of a professional degree/license, equitable results can be achieved under 
§ 11-106." Archer, 303 Md. at 359, 493 A.2d at 1080. 
104. This alternative plea for restitution is referred to only twice in appellant's brief. See 
Appellant's Brief at 4, 9, Archer v. Archer, 303 Md. 347, 493 A.2d 1074 (1985). 
Appellant's discussion follows: 
While conceding the split of authority on the issue before this Court, virtu-
ally all courts having refused to hold that a professional degree/license 
constitutes marital property have nevertheless ruled that equity requires 
the working spouse to be compensated in recognition for his or her contri-
butions toward attaining the degree/license. These courts have generally 
employed three methods to compensate the contributing spouse: 1) distri-
bution of marital assets and liabilities; 2) some form of restitution alimony; 
or 3) a monetary award based on equitable principles such as unjust 
enrichment. 
/d. at 9 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Appellant then turned to a discussion 
of valuation and did not refer to alternative theories of compensation again. 
105. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text. 
106. See supra text accompanying notes 30-36. 
107. Archer, 303 Md. at 359, 493 A.2d at 1081 (emphasis added). 
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tution is an appropriate remedy in a "university degree-divorce decree" 
case. 
As the Indiana legislature108 and a growing number of courts have 
recognized, 109 "Marriage should not be a free ticket to professional edu-
cation and training without subsequent obligations. . . . Those spouses 
supported through professional school should recognize that they may be 
called upon to reimburse the supporting spouses for the financial contri-
butions they received in pursuit of their professional training." 110 Resti-
tution is an appropriate remedy in these cases because the contributions 
are made and accepted with the shared expectation that in the future 
both parties will enjoy the rewards of the training. 111 Restitution ensures 
a minimal measure of fairness in circumstances where it would be unjust 
to allow the retention of a benefit without compensating the one who 
conferred it. 112 
The narrow issue before the Archer court was correctly decided: a 
professional degree is not marital property. The case, however, depicts 
an inherently unfair situation that was not foreseen by the Legislature 
and was not addressed by the Archer court. Because the court appears 
unwilling to adopt an equitable remedy in the "university degree-divorce 
decree" case, the Legislature must act. Indiana's statute granting reim-
bursement to a supporting spouse provides a model statute for a compen-
satory award that should be followed in Maryland. 
Shoshana L. Katz 
108. See supra text accompanying note 54. 
109. See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text. 
110. Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488. 503, 453 A.2d 527, 535 (1982). 
Ill. See DeLaRosa v. DeLaRosa, 309 N.W.2d 755,758 (Minn. 1981). 
112. See Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 135 Ariz. 346, 353, 661 P.2d 196, 203 (1982). 
